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Paula Olmos complains that philosophers dealing with the question of the justificatory 
power of testimony typically do not say much of anything about what testimony is. This 
is a complaint with which I have much sympathy.  In papers delivered at the 2003 and 
2005 OSSA conferences, my colleague, Fred Kauffeld, and I made a similar lament. In 
our view, those who deal with these sorts of issues tend to write as if “testifying” is an 
immediately recognizable and primary sort of practice that needs no further analysis. 
Coady, for example, assumes that it can be captured adequately by talking about those 
situations where individuals “tell” one another things.  He forgets that “telling” can also 
be used both when giving advice, as in “I’m telling you that’s a bad idea,” and when 
giving commands, as in “I’m telling you to put that away.” Others note that it involves 
some sort of assertion, or “saying-so.” But they fail to distinguish between assertions 
upon which the speaker takes a stand and a myriad of other ways in which one may assert 
but fail to provide an addressee with grounds for justified belief in a stated proposition. 
These include making jokes, taking a position in the midst of a so-called bull session, 
using irony or exaggeration, and gossiping about one’s acquaintances. 
 What Olmos is primarily interested in, however, is not the distinction between 
testimony and non-testimony. She is concerned with what she sees as the failure of those 
who discuss these topics to suggest or explore the diversity that exists with the domain of 
existing testimonial practices. More fundamentally, she is concerned with what she sees 
as the failure of those who do this even to focus on such practices in the first place. She 
notes that, for the purposes of theoretical clarity and in the service of their vision of 
testimony’s epistemic status, some have constructed theoretical models of how testimony 
might work in an ideal community and why. Others – which would presumably include 
Kauffeld and me – have rummaged around in what they take to be the pragmatics of 
language use to elucidate certain general features of all testimonial transactions. But 
none, she maintains, have looked at the ways in which testimony truly operates. And even 
when they believe that they have done so, what they have come up with are at best 
decontextualized pseudo-examples, such as “asking for directions in a strange city.” (This 
is an example used by Jonathan Adler, for instance, in his discussion of testimony in 
Belief’s Own Ethics.) Left out of such appeals are references to when practices of these 
kinds take place and among whom – what one has to know beforehand for them to make 
sense, what sorts of cultural mind-sets the individuals seeking to engage in them usually 
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enjoy, and so on – in short, all that is present in the context of actual instances of giving 
and receiving testimony. 
 Despite this difference in focus, however, I am sympathetic with this complaint of 
Olmos as well. Philosophers, as J.L. Austin famously observed, are notoriously prone to 
cultivate a small number of pet instances to prove their points, instances that seem more 
often than not to be cultivated primarily (though, heaven forbid, not with a conscious 
intent) precisely because they appear to provide evidence in favor of the point in 
question. The more actual work done on the character of embedded testimonial 
transactions, the better – although it should be noted in passing that, since such 
transactions are not always clearly labeled as such or understood as such by their 
participants, a working – at least initial – conception of what testimony involves, based 
(perhaps) on an understanding of the pragmatics of language use and exchange, might be 
beneficial in conducting detailed research of this kind. 
 What I am less sympathetic with is where Olmos goes with these concerns and 
what she thinks can be gained by paying closer attention to genuine testimonial practices. 
It’s not that I think that what she is saying in this part is wrong exactly – although I do 
have some questions about some of the specifics. It’s just that it seems to be redundant. 
The best current theories of testimony already provide what she says that we can get 
through paying attention to the practices attendant on the tradition of classical rhetoric. 
And they do this by tying such practices to a more general epistemological theory that has 
application across a range of potential sources of justified belief. 
 What it seems to me that Olmos is saying is basically this. (1) To find out what 
testimony is all about, one must pay serious attention to actual practice. Formal practices, 
for a variety of reasons, are especially revealing. (2) Testimonial statements cannot be 
evaluated in isolation. Rather, their plausibility must be established relative to a 
background of previous testimonies and beliefs generally held by the particular society or 
culture in which those statements are made. (3) This latter point is most clearly modeled 
in the practices associated with classical rhetoric, which fell out of favor in the early 
modern period, but which in fact give a much better account of testimony than “many 
contemporary decontextualized approaches.”  
Claim number (2), I take it, is Olmos’ most important claim. It is the claim that 
she thinks puts her most in opposition to those theories of testimony that she criticizes. 
Claim number (1), while debatable, simply lays out the technique that she will be using 
for generating evidence and I will not address it here. Similarly, claim number (3) deals 
with the source of the evidence that she is relying upon and I will not examine it further 
at this time. 
It is claim number (2) where the problem lies.  Who exactly is it that denies this 
claim? Take Richard Swinburne (1979) or Tyler Burge (1993) or Tony Coady (1992) or 
Robert Audi (1998) or Jonathan Adler (2002) or Michael Welbourne (1986) or Trudy 
Govier (1997) – all of whom have written on the topic of testimony in ways that Olmos 
would no doubt find objectionable. No matter what differences they may have in their 
views about the justification of the human practice of giving and receiving testimony, 
they all agree on one thing: that insofar as a speaker S, in whatever context, has testified 
that p to an addressee A (whatever the exact analysis of “testifying” may be), A is 
justified in believing that p (has evidence that p is true, has not failed in A’s epistemic 
duties by believing that p – depending on the account). But this is only the case, these 
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writers agree, given that A has no reason R that would serve to either undermine or 
overturn the justificatory power of S’s act of testifying. That is, among other things, A is 
only justified if A has no reason to believe that S is untrustworthy with respect to p or no 
good independent reason to believe that p is false. 
 It is this latter clause that is crucial. For what it says is that within the framework 
of views of this kind what Olmos calls the “cognitive environment” of the act of 
testifying is not disregarded, it is not irrelevant. To the contrary, this environment is 
crucial to determining the act’s justificatory power for the addressee or addressees in the 
situation in which the act of testifying occurs. For example, if in one cognitive 
environment A is told by S that S saw such-and-such a plane catch on fire in mid-air, 
contrary to what news reports say (and A correctly understands that in this instance S 
intends A to understand that S takes responsibility for A using this telling to support the 
claim in question – the analysis of testifying provided by Kauffeld and Fields), then A 
has evidence that this event has occurred (this being one standard interpretation of 
“justificatory power”). But in another cognitive environment – one in which it is common 
knowledge that people are very often mistaken about what they see during mid-air plane 
accidents – S’s claim will not provide evidence for A in this regard. It may not provide 
evidence for the negation of this claim either. (In this situation, the proper approach may 
be to suspend judgment). But it is a direct consequence of the sort of theory of testimony 
laid out by the various writers mentioned above. 
What may be misleading about this aspect of these theories of testimony, is that 
this reference to the cognitive environment of various testimonial transactions only 
overtly enters into the discussion in those cases where the testimony in question is in 
sharp negative contrast to a particular such background. There is no attempt among these 
theorists to discuss what is going on when a piece of testimony comports well with the 
beliefs that have gone before it. Indeed, this sort of situation seems to be of little interest 
to such theorists, as is aptly illustrated by Olmos’ quote from Fumerton. 
However, Fumerton’s quote can be misunderstood. It is not as if these theorists 
are saying that the causal and doxastic antecedents of an individual’s accepting a 
particular piece of testimony are of no importance tout court. Rather, what they are 
saying is that this is not where we should be looking in order to find a justification for 
using testimony as evidence consistent with the power, flexibility, ubiquity, and open-
endedness of this practice as it is appears in a wide variety of cases. Certainly, in many 
cases, individuals will have built up with respect to one another track-records regarding 
one another’s reliability, sufficient to justify their using each other’s testimony as 
evidence in favor of the beliefs testified to. So, too, a society may have – or presume to 
have – sufficient evidence in favor of the reliability of certain authorities in that society 
sufficient to justify using those authorities’ testimony as evidence in favor of the claims 
that they have avowed. But how do these facts help to provide one with a justification for 
belief in the myriad cases where no track-record is available, where no authority can be 
appropriately cited, where indeed belief is unconscious, unmediated, or automatic? How 
do they help provide one with a justification for belief in those cases where one is 
wondering whether to believe those who tell one that so-and-so constitutes an authority in 
one’s society or that such-and-such is the proper way in which to respond to what other 
people have said? 
3 
JOHN E. FIELDS 
It is because these sorts of questions are considered basic by those theorists whom 
Olmos criticizes that they focus so often on examples like the one of asking for directions 
in a strange city. It is true, as Olmos points out, that this practice is dependent upon a 
variety of contextual factors that are usually ignored by those who use it as an example: 
beliefs about politeness, levels of prior knowledge, and so on. But, for these thinkers, the 
wonder is not that people might have various attitudes and beliefs that would make them 
hesitant to engage in such a practice or that would give them the confidence (if indeed 
that is the right word) to do otherwise. The wonder is that anybody – even those who 
would have the confidence and knowledge to put themselves forward in this manner – 
would ever treat the responses that were generated in this way as evidence sufficient to 
guide them. The point here is not that this is a typical case. It is rather that this is a test 
case. The idea is that unless one’s theory is powerful enough to encompass and make 
sense of an example of this kind, it will not be very useful as an account of how and why 
testimony is actually produced and employed.  
So, it is not as if these thinkers ignore context. They just don’t bring it in, as we 
might put it, at the front end – for which they think they have good reasons. For them as 
much as for Olmos, a testimonially-based belief in any particular case occurs within the 
context of a vast network of past testimonies and beliefs. It occurs in media res. But it is 
not necessarily made “usable” by such a network, though it can, of course, readily be 







Adler, J. (2002). Belief’s Own Ethics. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Audi, R. (1998). Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. New York: 
Routledge. 
Burge, T. (1993). Content preservation. The Philosophical Review 102: 457-488. 
Coady, C.A.J. (1992). Testimony: A Philosophical Study. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kauffeld, F.J. & Fields, J.E. (2003). The presumption of veracity in testimony and gossip. In J.A. Blair, et 
al. (Eds.), Informal Logic at 25: Proceedings of the Windsor Conference. Windsor, ON: OSSA. 
Kauffeld, F.J. & Fields, J.E. (2005). The commitments speakers undertake in giving testimony. In D. 
Hitchcock, (Ed.), The Uses of Argument: Proceedings of a Conference at McMaster University. 
Hamilton, ON: OSSA. 
Govier, T. (1997). Social Trust and Human Communities. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Swinburne, R. (1979). The Existence of God. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Welbourne, M. (1986). The Community of Knowledge. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. 
 
4 
